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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After the district court denied her motion to suppress, Cara E. Williams pled guilty
to possession of a controlled substance, unlawful conveyance of articles into county jail,
and possession of drug paraphernalia. She appeals from her judgment of conviction,
challenging the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. She contends the
district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the officer who detained
her violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution by
detaining her in the absence of reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 8:46 p.m. on June 4, 2015, police officer Willie Cowell noticed a
minivan parked partially on the roadway on Deep Creek Loop Road in Bonners Ferry,
Idaho. (10/8/15 Tr., p.7, L.2 – p.8, L.18; p.10, L.24-p.11, L.7.) He had received a call
from one of his colleagues alerting him to the presence of the minivan.

(10/8/15

Tr., p.26, L.12 – p.27, L.3.) Officer Cowell called in a motorist assist, stopped his patrol
vehicle, and “activated [his] rear ambers.” (10/18/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-13; p.25, L.24 –
p.25, L.8.) He asked the driver and passenger of the minivan three times if they needed
assistance.

(R., p.114; 10/18/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-19.)

They repeatedly said “no.”

(R., p.114.) Officer Cowell testified at the suppression hearing that at this point, there
was “no need to investigate a motorist assist.” (10/18/15 Tr., p.28, L.22 – p.29, L.1.)
Officer Cowell nonetheless continued his investigation. He asked the driver for
his license, registration and proof of insurance.

(10/8/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.17-22; p.29,

Ls.21-23.) He then approached the passenger, who was standing by the guardrail.
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(10/8/15 Tr., p.11, L.20 – p.12, L.2.) The passenger identified herself as Cara Williams,
but denied having any identification. (10/8/15 Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.20; p.13, L.19 –
p.14, L.14.)

Approximately five minutes after the initial encounter, Officer Cowell

contacted dispatch and learned the driving privileges of both the driver and Ms. Williams
had been suspended. (10/8/15 Tr., p.12, L.11 – p.14, L.7.)
Officer Cowell told the driver he would not be cited or arrested for driving without
privileges and could contact a friend with a valid driver’s license for a ride and to move
the minivan from the roadway. (R., p.114.) Officer Cowell continued to question the
driver and Ms. Williams and, over the course of the next fifteen minutes, became
suspicious of illegal activity. (R., pp.114-15.) Thirty-three minutes into the encounter,
Officer Cowell asked Ms. Williams if he could search the minivan and she did not give
consent, but said she gives consent to law enforcement “all the time,” which Officer
Cowell thought was suspicious. (R., p.115; 10/8/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-12; p.21, L.5.)
At this point, two other officers had arrived on scene, and Officer Cowell asked
one of the officers to request a drug dog. (R., p.115.) Officer Cowell then advised
Ms. Williams of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
(R., p.115.) Approximately 48 minutes after the initial contact, a border patrol agent
arrived on scene with his drug dog, who alerted on the vehicle. (R., p.115.) A search of
the vehicle led to the discovery of drug paraphernalia inside Ms. Williams’ purse, which
she had previously been ordered to place in the vehicle.1 (R., pp.115-16.) Ms. Williams
was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., p.116.)

Officer Cowell

Counsel for Ms. Williams did not argue in the district court that Ms. Williams’ rights
were violated when she was ordered to place her purse in the vehicle. (R., pp.82-97.)
As such, she does not raise this issue on appeal.
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remained at the scene until he received a call that he was needed at the jail.
(R., p.116.)
Ms. Williams was charged by Information with possession of a controlled
substance, unlawful conveyance of articles into county jail, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.38-39, 54-56.) She filed a motion to suppress, arguing her rights
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17
of the Idaho Constitution were violated because she was unlawfully detained and her
detention was unlawfully extended. (R., pp.69-70, 82-97.) Following a hearing, the
district court issued a memorandum decision and order denying Ms. Williams’ motion.
(R., pp.113-23.)

The district court concluded the initial contact was a consensual

encounter; Ms. Williams’ detention was not unlawfully extended; and the warrantless
search of the vehicle was lawful based on the drug dog’s alert. (R., pp.117-122.)
Following the district court’s decision, Ms. Williams pled guilty, without the benefit
of a plea agreement, to the three charged offenses, reserving her right to appeal from
the denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.124-35.) The district court sentenced
Ms. Williams to a unified term of four years, with two years fixed, and then suspended
the sentence and placed Ms. Williams on supervised probation for a period of three
years. (R., p.140.) The judgment was entered on January 7, 2016. (R., pp.139-43.)
Ms. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal on January 20, 2016. (R., pp.148-50.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Williams’ motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Williams’ Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Ms. Williams’ motion to suppress because it concluded

Officer Cowell had reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot, thus
justifying both his detention of Ms. Williams and his extension of that detention to
request a drug dog. (R., p.121.) The district court erred. At the time Officer Cowell
detained Ms. Williams and later prolonged her detention to request a drug dog, he did
not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Officer Cowell violated Ms. Williams’
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the district
court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress

evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207
(2009) (citation omitted). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous.

However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s

application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted).
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial
court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted).
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C.

Officer Cowell Did Not Have Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion Of Criminal
Activity When He Detained Ms. Williams And Requested A Drug Dog
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of

every citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Here, Ms. Williams
was seized, at the latest, when Officer Cowell asked one of the other officers on scene
to request a drug dog, as she would not have felt free to leave at that point. See
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (stating that, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, an individual is seized if a reasonable person in her position would not have
believed she was free to leave).

“A seizure for purposes of investigation may be

supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion by the police that, based on the totality
of the circumstances, the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.”

State v.

Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 828 (Ct. App. 1992). When Officer Cowell requested a drug
dog, he did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that Ms. Williams was engaged in
criminal activity.
The district court found Officer Cowell had reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity because (1) the driver of the minivan gave inconsistent answers when
questioned about whom he knew in Boundary County and whom he was there to see;
(2) neither the driver nor Ms. Williams contacted anyone for a ride; and (3) when he was
running the minivan’s VIN number through dispatch, he noticed the driver step out of the
minivan to join Ms. Williams on the passenger side of the vehicle, where they were out
of his view, although they stepped back into his view when he finished running the VIN
number. (R., pp.114-15.) He also asked Ms. Williams if he could search the minivan
and she did not give consent, but said she gives consent to law enforcement “all the
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time,” which he believed to be suspicious.2 (R., p.115; 10/8/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-12; p.21,
L.5.)
These factors are not sufficient to support reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity.

The fact that the driver gave inconsistent answers to the officer’s

questions cannot support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the
driver, let alone the passenger.

The fact that neither the driver nor Ms. Williams

contacted anyone for a ride might suggest they did not know anyone in the area, or
were reluctant to call on a friend for help, but it did not suggest criminal activity.
Likewise, the fact that the driver stepped out of the minivan to talk to Ms. Williams while
the officer was running the minivan’s VIN number did not suggest criminal activity.
Ms. Williams was outside of the minivan, and the driver stepped out to speak to her.
That the two of them were briefly outside of the officer’s viewpoint is of little
consequence.

None of these factors viewed alone, or taken together, support a

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Ms. Williams’ refusal to consent to the search of the minivan adds little to the
reasonable suspicion analysis. The Court of Appeals recognized in State v. Aguirre,
141 Idaho 560, 564 (Ct. App. 2005), that a driver has the right to refuse to consent to a
search. The Court explained in State v. Neal, that “[i]t is an individual’s right to refuse
the search of his vehicle and that right would be eviscerated if such refusal could itself
give rise to reasonable suspicion, thereby rendering consent unnecessary.” 159 Idaho

The district court also discussed, as a factor contributing to the officer’s reasonable
suspicion, Ms. Williams’ “increasingly animated, agitated, and obnoxious behavior
during the course of the contact.” (R., p.120.) However, Officer Cowell testified at the
suppression hearing that it was only after he requested a drug dog that Ms. Williams
became “very agitated.” (10/8/15 Tr., p.21, L.22 – p.22, L.5.)
2
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919, ___, 367 P.3d 1231, 12367-37 (Ct. App. 2016). Officer Cowell lacked reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity at the time he detained Ms. Williams and requested a drug
dog. Officer Cowell’s detention of Ms. Williams at this point violated her rights under the
Fourth Amendment and the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Williams respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction, reverse
the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress, and remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 12th day of October, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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